Chapter 3
Social Cohesion and Tolerance for Group Differences

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Introduction

Issues of tolerance, understanding, solidarity, and social cohesion represent a key foundation for building cultures of peace (United Nations 1999). Tolerance and understanding ensure that perceived differences in group membership, values, or lifestyle do not result in discrimination and violence (Vogt 1997), whereas social cohesion and solidarity connote a sense of enhanced unity, democracy, and civic participation (Moody and White 2003; Putnam 2000).

Though often discussed together, there is a potential antagonism involving the societal consequences of tolerance and social cohesion. Specifically, social cohesion is often achieved and strengthened through destructive means, such as by developing an external enemy or creating an internal scapegoat. Attempts to promote social cohesion can therefore result in decreased tolerance for differences within a society and even lead to the exclusion of groups who do not represent the internal standard or who are depicted as the internal enemy. Thus, the main question of this chapter is: How can social cohesion be achieved in a way that it is not exclusive and destructive, but rather inclusive and constructive (see Valsiner, this volume), thereby effectively contributing to a culture of peace?

Potential answers to this question will differ depending on the nature of the societal context. Nation-building in postconflict societies and countries divided by civil war is often challenged with economic hardships, security concerns, or power struggles between groups (Winter and Cava 2006). These forms of instability must be addressed as efforts are taken to achieve social cohesion in such societies. For the purpose of the present chapter, we will focus our analysis on tolerance and social cohesion in the context of structural inequality and intergroup relations in more stable societies. From a social-psychological perspective, we propose that the solution for achieving social cohesion in relatively stable societies may lie in shifting processes of social categorization toward the perception of a superordinate identity between members of different groups. At the same time, we propose that tolerance for group differences must also be emphasized to ensure that social cohesion contributes to cultures of peace within societies as well as to global cultures of peace between societies.

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Building Social Cohesion and Cultures of Peace: A Double-Edged Sword

In social sciences such as psychology, sociology, and economics, the topic of social cohesion has received much research attention, which has amounted to a range of different conceptualizations (Friedkin 2004) and close associations with related concepts such as "solidarity" (Moody and White 2003) and "social capital" (Helly et al. 2003). Although a unified definition is lacking, what is shared by all definitions is the idea that social cohesion refers to the "connectedness" of a society (White 2003, p. 55), or, put simply, "the glue that binds people together" (Lavis and Stoddart 2003, p. 122).

Accordingly, social cohesion involves multiple levels of analysis, including subjective, microlevel phenomena associated with the psychology of individuals and more objective, macrolevel dimensions of communities and societies. However, the subjective perception of cohesion is distinct from objective, structural characteristics of a group (Bollen and Hoyle 1990). Psychological research on social cohesion has typically examined individuals' subjective orientations toward their social groups, such as group members' sense of belonging, the strength of their identification, and the perceived attractiveness of their group (see Friedkin 2004). By contrast, structural aspects of social cohesion have been the focus of much research in sociology, particularly that examining social networks. This work tends to operationalize social cohesion in terms of a group's connectedness as evidenced through existing friendship ties and networks (Moody and White 2003) and through other objective indicators of interdependence among group members, such as cooperation (Stanley 2003) and civic participation (Putnam 2000).

Both subjective and objective dimensions are needed not only to characterize social cohesion, but also to explain its outcomes and consequences. Thus, rather than examining these components separately, we agree with Friedkin (2004) that a more useful approach to the study of social cohesion would involve interactions between the micro- and macrolevels of analysis. Only the interplay between individuals' orientations toward their group and the structural conditions surrounding their experiences as group members can provide a comprehensive understanding of the nature and functions of social cohesion.

How Social Cohesion Contributes to Peace

Moreover, incorporating both micro- and macrolevels of analysis helps us to understand how social cohesion contributes to developing cultures of peace. Many of the individual and structural consequences of social cohesion are linked to peace in a positive feedback loop, such that each can help to promote the other. For example, it has been argued that social cohesion is linked to economic growth (Dayton-Johnson 2003) and at the same time eases the resolution of distributional conflicts,

thereby reducing the likelihood that conflict over resources would occur in the first place (Osberg 2003). Similarly, through processes such as enhanced cooperation, reciprocity, and perceived solidarity, social cohesion is typically linked to a more equitable distribution of social and economic resources, including more positive health outcomes (Lavis and Stoddart 2003). Increased equality contributes to more peaceful relations within a society (Stanley 2003), illustrated in findings such as that social cohesion is associated with decreased violence and a reduced risk of societal conflict (Osberg 2003). Thus, a positive cycle may develop wherein greater degrees of social cohesion would foster cooperation, reduce tension, and promote economic growth, which may in turn serve to reinforce social cohesion (Osberg 2003).

As such, these examples illustrate that social cohesion can contribute both to the diminution of conflict and violence (i.e., "negative" peace) and to the promotion of equality and social justice (i.e., "positive" peace; see Galtung 1969). Nevertheless, the described phenomena do not specify who is included in the group that benefits from cohesiveness and how the boundaries of cohesive groups are defined. Moreover, even when social cohesion is achieved *within* a society, it does not necessarily contribute to peace *between* societies and nations; in fact, it may even be detrimental to the development of such peace. Therefore, more careful consideration is needed regarding the potentially negative consequences of social cohesion as we pursue attempts to promote cultures of peace both within societies and between nations.

Negative Consequences of Social Cohesion for Peace

In particular, two potential limitations of social cohesion for promoting cultures of peace have been identified in the social science research literature. One is the tendency for social cohesion within a society to increase in the context of external conflict (Simmel 1955; Stein 1976). For example, external conflict is especially likely to enhance cohesion within a society when power is already centralized within a group and political elites are sufficiently united (Coser 1956). Instrumentalizing a common enemy or perceived external threat is then often used by politicians to unite citizens more and strengthen the social cohesion that is necessary to gain support for war or other violence against other groups (see Pettigrew 2003).

A second limitation concerns how social cohesion may inhibit the promotion of peace within a society. Especially in times of conflict, social cohesion is often achieved by decreasing tolerance for differences across segments of society, including "the silencing of divergent opinions, increases in adherence to group symbols, and intolerance for out-groups and dissenters" (Kunovich and Hodson 1999, p. 648). Social cohesion can then take on extreme forms and result in destructive social movements that have negative consequences for both relations between nations and within a society (Helly et al. 2003).

In sum, social cohesion is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it can contribute to the promotion of peace and more equal distributions of resources in society. On the other hand, social cohesion is often reinforced through external

conflict and based on reduced tolerance for group differences. It is therefore crucial to examine social cohesion more closely in terms of group processes studied in social-psychological research and particularly concerning how social identities are constructed and maintained within a given society.

Social Identity and Social Cohesion

A large body of research from the social identity tradition (Tajfel 1978; Turner 1987) has investigated these processes and laid the basis for our understanding of how people construe their group memberships and how these construals influence attitudes and behavior towards others. Central to social categorization theory is the assumption that people perceive themselves and others as belonging to social groups and base part of their self-concept on group memberships (Turner 1987). Social categorization leads individuals to perceive greater similarities to members of the own group, while differences to other social groups are exaggerated. On this basis, people are evaluated and treated differently depending on their group membership, with a tendency to favor ingroup over outgroup members (Tajfel 1978). Thus, social identity is an important antecedent of social cohesion, which emerges when individuals identify as members of a particular group and feel an attraction to members of this group (Hogg 1992).

Attraction to fellow group members has been identified as a central affective process leading to social cohesion (Hogg 1992), which can encourage positive outcomes such as cooperative efforts to work for the common good of the group (see Friedkin 2004). It is important to note that this attraction is depersonalized, such that it is not based on unique characteristics of the people involved, but rather on how well people represent the group (Hogg et al. 1995). Thus, ingroup members who are more similar to the prototype of the group are generally liked more (Hogg et al. 1995), whereas ingroup members who deviate from the ingroup norm are generally liked less (Abrams et al. 2000).

The tendency for social cohesion to enhance rejection of deviants can also have important consequences for relations with other groups. Although ingroup favoritism does not necessarily result in outgroup derogation (Brewer 1999), positive attitudes toward the ingroup may become a fertile ground for antagonism toward outgroups under certain conditions (Mummendey et al. 2001). For example, when a strong attachment to the ingroup is coupled with a glorified belief in the ingroup's superiority (Roccas et al. 2006), then ingroup favoritism tends to predict outgroup derogation (Mummendey et al. 2001).[*] Similarly, such strong forms of

[*] In the literature, a conceptual distinction has been made between constructive and destructive forms of attachment to one's national ingroup. The constructive and positive form of national identification, which does not predict negative outgroup attitudes, has been referred to as "patriotism" (Kosterman and Feshbach 1989). In contrast, strong ingroup attachment, which also entails the belief that the national ingroup is superior and should dominate over other groups, has been contrasted with patriotism and referred to as "nationalism" (Kosterman and Feshbach 1989) or "ingroup glorification" (Roccas et al. 2006).

identification as nationalism have been associated with advocacy for war against other nations (Van Evera 1994) and with decreased guilt regarding the ingroup's perpetration of intergroup violence in the context of ethnic conflict (Roccas et al. 2006). Likewise, nationalism has been shown to increase the rejection of perceived outgroups within nations, above all racial, ethnic, and religious minority groups (Mummendey et al. 2001).

Thus, by encouraging people to value and support their ingroup, social cohesion can carry a significant risk of devaluing and even harming other groups, both between and within societies (see Dovidio et al. 1998). However, one possible solution to these potentially negative consequences grows from decades of social-psychological research showing that superordinate group categorizations can be used to promote inclusion and social cohesion within pluralistic societies.

Will Superordinate Identity Achieve Social Cohesion in Pluralistic Societies?

Social-psychological research has placed a significant emphasis on the role of inclusiveness in decreasing prejudice, toward the broader goals of promoting tolerance for and cohesion among diverse groups in society (Gaertner et al. 1994). The Common Ingroup Identity Model, proposed by Gaertner and Dovidio (2000), suggests that members of different groups can be induced to perceive themselves as part of one superordinate group (e.g., a nation), rather than as members of multiple, distinct groups (e.g., ethnic groups within a nation). Through this process, the salience of original group boundaries may be reduced, at the same time as members of different groups begin to perceive themselves and others as part of a more inclusive superordinate group. By virtue of being included in the same superordinate group, outgroup members then become beneficiaries of positive attitudes and behaviors typically reserved for ingroup members, such as increased prosocial behavior, a more equal distribution of resources, and more favorable attribution patterns (Gaertner and Dovidio 2000). In sum, based on this body of research, it may be proposed that enhancing a sense of shared group membership within a superordinate category should increase social cohesion in pluralistic societies.

Risking Social Conflict by Creating Superordinate Identities

However, despite this potential to resolve social conflict, imposing superordinate identities potentially can create new sources of conflict in diverse societies. Specifically, when individuals find themselves in highly inclusive, superordinate groups, a motivation to maintain the positive distinctiveness of the original ingroup from other groups included in the superordinate category may be activated (Brewer 1991). Thus, rather than promoting cohesion, expectations that people would

relinquish identities associated with distinct subgroups (e.g., ethnic identity) within the inclusive category (e.g., national identity) may provoke defensive reactions that arouse intergroup tensions. For example, people are often more likely to favor their own subgroups and derogate other subgroups when only the superordinate category is made salient and subgroup differences are not acknowledged (Crisp et al. 2006). This effect is particularly pronounced among those who identify strongly with their subgroup. However, this response can be alleviated by simultaneously highlighting the salience of subgroup memberships and the superordinate category (Crisp et al. 2006; Hornsey and Hogg 2000).

Another danger in emphasizing superordinate identities is that the prototype of the inclusive category may be construed to apply primarily to the dominant, majority group and may be less inclusive of minority subgroups (Mummendey and Wenzel 1999). For example, recent studies suggest that Asian American, African American, and Hispanic American faces are rated as less "American" than European American faces are (Cheryan and Monin 2005). Similarly, on the implicit level, these minority subgroups are less closely associated with the superordinate national category "American" than are European Americans (Devos and Banaji 2005).

In diverse societies, such tendencies counteract opportunities for minority groups to contribute equally to the shaping of superordinate identities as a means to social cohesion (Mummendey and Wenzel 1999). Minority group members are often keenly aware that they are not equally included by majority group members in the superordinate category, even when they identify with it (Barlow et al. 2000). Thus, minority group members might feel pressured to give up their cultural values and customs in order to feel more accepted within the superordinate category (see Berry 1984).[†]

In contrast, a pluralistic notion of intergroup relations that values diversity within the broadly construed superordinate category can promote a sense of inclusion among minority and majority groups (see Jones et al. 2000). A growing body of evidence indicates that those who have more inclusive representations of superordinate groups exhibit lower degrees of intergroup bias than those who have less inclusive representations (Gaertner et al. 1994). This research suggests that a common ingroup identity is only likely to enhance social cohesion effectively when subgroup identities are acknowledged and valued within a superordinate entity. As such, social cohesion in pluralistic societies requires not only the toleration of minority groups through their inclusion in a superordinate category, but also tolerance for divergent values, lifestyles, and norms that are linked to different subgroup identities within this superordinate category (see Helly et al. 2003; Stanley 2003).

[†] However, it is crucial to include minorities not just superficially. Research on "tokenism" shows that the (numerically) minimal inclusion of minority group members in organizations and institutions in fact inhibits collective action aimed at long-term structural change (Wright et al. 1990). Thus, mere tokenism may actually be detrimental to social justice and cultures of peace.

Tolerance for Subgroup Differences and Its Importance for Social Cohesion

Generally, tolerance is based on the perception of differences and diversity with which individuals are concerned (Vogt 1997). Many definitions of the concept center around negative attitudes in regard to these differences, using tolerance only to describe reactions towards groups that are otherwise disliked (e.g., Mondak and Sanders 2003). For example, Vogt (1997) defines tolerance as "intentional self-restraint in the face of something one dislikes, objects to, finds threatening, or otherwise has a negative attitude toward—usually in order to maintain a social or political group or to promote harmony in a group" (p. 3). Due to its negative connotation, many have rejected the concept as antiquated and argue that we need to move beyond it (see discussion in Vogt 1997). However, more positive definitions and a "warmer grade of tolerance" (Allport 1954, p. 425) may include the right to express diverse opinions and lifestyles (Corbett 1982) and an appreciation of diversity and group differences (Mummendey and Wenzel 1999).

Tolerance for Subgroup Differences

A social-psychological approach that incorporates this conceptualization of tolerance is the Mutual Intergroup Differentiation Model (MIDM; Hewstone and Brown 1986). This model highlights the importance of groups emphasizing their mutual distinctiveness and subgroup identities within the superordinate category, specifying that these processes should occur in contexts of cooperative interdependence. Interdependence implies that each group contributes equally to the realization of superordinate goals (Sherif et al. 1954), thereby providing them with separate but complementary roles. Rather than trying to eliminate status differences, it is proposed that strengths of each group should be recognized with equal value (Hewstone and Brown 1986).

In many respects, the MIDM optimally addresses the problems discussed above. First, since diversity is recognized as a benefit and social value, subgroup identities are valued within the superordinate category (Jones et al. 2000). This avoids the identity threat that may arise from pressures to assimilate to a common prototype, which may be implied in the recategorization process of the common ingroup identity model (Gaertner and Dovidio 2000; Hewstone and Brown 1986). Moreover, the need to distinguish oneself positively from other groups (Brewer 1991) can be realized in the MIDM by highlighting the strengths of each group. In sum, with its emphasis on preserving subgroup identities and minimizing distinctiveness threat, the MIDM shares its assumptions with the multiculturalism perspective and is also in line with integrationist approaches towards social cohesion (Berry 1984; Mummendey and Wenzel 1999).

In these pluralistic approaches, tolerance entails that not just one group is perceived as the prototype of the superordinate identity. Thus, a social-psychological approach to assessing tolerance for diversity suggests looking at how the prototype of the superordinate identity is construed (Mummendey and Wenzel 1999). If this prototype does not include a particular, specific image of a group or a strict set of norms, tolerance of differences becomes more likely. In other words, a *broad* prototype means that more variance around norms will be tolerated. In addition, a *complex* prototype endorses diverse, even opposing mores, as part of the superordinate category. Examples of these trends involve tolerance for religious differences (see Putnam 2007), in that variability in religious background is more accepted in present-day American society (i.e., broad prototype) and members of different religious groups are free to engage in a wide range of religious practices (i.e., complex prototype). In sum, tolerance for difference is maximized when differences in group norms are not among the defining criteria of the prototype, when its scope is broad enough to include diverse sets of norms, and when the prototype embraces various practices and traditions (Mummendey and Wenzel 1999).

Ultimately, these criteria imply that diversity in opinions, values, and lifestyles is accepted and established as a positive norm in cohesive societies (Mummendey and Wenzel 1999; Stanley 2003). However, even when diversity is valued, commonalities in values and norms are also necessary (Annan 1999) in order to prevent societal fragmentation or anomie. Such shared values, which may also include a focus on diversity and/or the protection of minority rights, may be communicated through national constitutions (see Toggenburg 2004), as well as in international agreements such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (see Annan 1999).

At the same time, diversity within a society may lead people to become less trusting and more inclined to withdraw from collective life than people in more homogenous societies (Putnam 2007). However, as Putnam (2007) also argues, the challenges that diversity brings to social cohesion involve short-term risks, whereas the long-term benefits of diversity become more apparent as tolerance for differences increases and shared identities are strengthened. He proposes that these positive trends may be achieved by creating "…more opportunities for meaningful interaction across ethnic lines where Americans (new and old) work, learn, recreate, and live" (Putnam 2007, p. 164). In line with this view, research on intergroup contact shows that forging close, meaningful cross-group relationships predicts significant reductions in intergroup prejudice and a greater willingness to trust across group boundaries (Pettigrew 1997; Tropp, 2008). Moreover, these positive effects may even occur in the context of intractable conflict. For example, among Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, contact with outgroup members predicted a greater willingness to forgive and trust the outgroup, even among those who had personally suffered due to the conflict (Hewstone et al. 2006).

In sum, social science research on superordinate identities suggests that tolerance, understood as an appreciation of intergroup differences, is essential in shaping a cohesive, pluralistic society. Moreover, this research suggests that the acknowledgement and inclusion of subgroup differences within superordinate

categories and the development of meaningful relationships across group boundaries can propel a form of social cohesion that contributes to building cultures of peace while minimizing the risk of new conflict.

Situating Research on Social Identity and Social Cohesion in Context

Important policy implications can be derived from research indicating the strengths and obstacles associated with using superordinate categories in our attempts to create social cohesion in diverse societies. Potential applications of this work requires careful consideration of the political, economic, and historical context, as these factors will necessarily influence the ways in which superordinate and subgroup identities affect social cohesion (Hogg 1992). Nonetheless, the research described above suggests a number of basic principles that should be taken into account as we attempt to promote social cohesion through the use of superordinate categories.

First, it is crucial that we remain aware of power and status differences between groups when we rely on inclusive, superordinate categories in pluralistic societies. For example, whether intentional or unintentional, the majority group might be inclined to play a dominant role in defining norms, values, and standards for the superordinate category (Mummendey and Wenzel 1999), which could provoke negative and counterproductive effects for both minority and majority group members (Stanley 2003). However, this tendency can be counteracted by carefully examining policies for potential bias and by ensuring the inclusion of perspectives of minority representatives (see Jones et al. 2000). Thus, potential pitfalls associated with group differences in power and status can be curbed by the explicit acknowledgment and integration of subgroup differences (see Hornsey and Hogg 2000; Mummendey and Wenzel 1999).

Moreover, to be effective and contribute to social cohesion and peace, use of the superordinate category must be accepted by all groups in society. For example, differential evaluation of the superordinate Yugoslav identity by members of majority and minority groups is believed to be one of the reasons for its failure in this region (Seculic et al. 1994), as minorities (Croats in Bosnia and Serbia, or Serbs in Croatia) tended to identify more with the superordinate Yugoslav identity than did the majorities (e.g., Serbs living in Serbia). Conversely, depending on how superordinate categories are defined, members of minority groups (e.g., racial minorities in the US) may be less inclined to identify with the superordinate category (e.g., "American") than members of the majority (e.g., White Americans; see Sidanius et al. 1997). Such tendencies are likely to be influenced by the perceived instrumental value of an inclusive category (Seculic et al. 1994), which can vary substantially depending on the contexts and histories of relations between the groups involved. Hence, when designing policies aimed at creating a superordinate category, careful attention must be paid to potential differences in the perceived value it may have for members of different status groups.

Relatedly, superordinate identities created through coercion will not likely contribute to social cohesion and peace, such as when they are imposed in dictatorships or by authoritarian regimes (Stanley 2003). Many cases in recent history have demonstrated the failure and overt rejection of such attempts. Examples include former Communist countries such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, which attempted to unite multiple ethnic groups under a superordinate category and later experienced separationist movements and increased ethnic conflicts (Seculic et al. 1994).

Ethnopolitical conflicts such as these create new challenges for the construction of inclusive, superordinate categories with which people can identify. One such challenge involves unstable economic conditions and security concerns that result in high levels of stress and uncertainty in contexts of conflict. It has been suggested that a high need for certainty and reduced cognitive complexity may explain why identities are defined more narrowly when individuals or social groups are under economic, political, or military pressure (Brewer and Pierce 2005; see also Gay 2006; Webster et al. 1997).

Political and educational systems must therefore create a social climate that is inclusive and cultivates tolerant forms of social cohesion (see de Rivera and Paez 2007; de Rivera, this volume) in which subgroup differences are acknowledged and diversity becomes the norm. For instance, although the population of Mauritius consists of several ethnic groups (with an Indian majority, followed by Creoles and Chinese), nationhood is defined by the belief of achieving unity through diversity so that no single culture is considered to be dominant in Mauritian society (Ng-Tseung 2006). Similarly, the success of the European Union as a superordinate identity has relied on the fact that it did not try to replace national identities, but rather complemented them (Lacata 2003). This is institutionalized and symbolized, for example, in the shared currency (Euro), for which variations of coins are produced with a national symbol of each country that can be used in any other EU country, and in passports that have both the name and emblem of the respective country as well as the words “European Union” in the national language (see also Fry and Bonte, this volume). Clearly, the precise application and success of such measures will depend on the context in question, and strategies to promote social cohesion and tolerance are necessarily shaped by economic, political, and educational conditions of any given context (see Kimmel, this volume; Salomon, this volume). However, some examples of successful policies that reinforce the perception of an inclusive superordinate identity are the institutionalized use of multiple languages in a country, as in the cases of Canada or Switzerland; the official observance of religious holidays from all confessions, as has been implemented in India; or the legalization of dual citizenship, as has been debated in Germany in recent years.

Last but not least, it is important to use positive, constructive policies as a basis for social cohesion (see Valsiner, this volume). For example, rather than striving to enhance social cohesion through destructive actions ranging from excluding certain groups within societies to instigating violence between nations, social policies that emphasize mutual care and responsibility may instead become the basis for social cohesion (e.g., Canada’s health-care system). Such constructive policies can promote a positive definition of the national identity and create a shared sense of

social security, solidarity, and equality among all citizens, which is conducive to the development of social cohesion (see White 2003).

Conclusion

Social cohesion is generally viewed as an important basis of a peaceful society. However, definitions and conceptualizations of social cohesion must take into account who is included in the cohesive group, how much diversity is tolerated within this group, and whether the positive effects of social cohesion are achieved at the expense of destructive consequences for other groups. We believe it is only through a positive, constructive conceptualization that social cohesion will contribute effectively and sustainably to peace.

Fostering the perception of a superordinate identity between members of society can be an effective way to overcome some of the challenges that diversity poses to the achievement of social cohesion. However, when the superordinate category is defined primarily by the dominant group and does not take into account differences between groups in society, it may have detrimental and counterproductive effects for both minority and majority groups. In order to avoid the risk of new conflict and achieve social cohesion, it is therefore necessary to acknowledge and integrate subgroup identities in the construction of the superordinate identity.

Of course, these identity processes are not the only factors that are important to take into account as we work to enhance social cohesion. Especially in postconflict societies and war-torn regions, structural concerns such as the lack of security, struggle for power, and economic problems are essential to address. Nevertheless, social identity processes will also influence the distribution of scarce resources and power. Thus, it is crucial to consider both structural factors and social-psychological processes as they jointly influence social cohesion.

In conclusion, social cohesion is essential for cultures of peace, but only when it is inclusive of various groups and accompanied by tolerance of differences within society. Furthermore, it should be based on constructive goals that denote caring and social welfare rather than on destructive or exclusive means. The immense challenge is that tolerance and inclusiveness are not only the ultimate goal, but also that a minimal amount is necessary in order to start building social cohesion in diverse societies. However, when social cohesion is achieved in a constructive, inclusive, and tolerant manner, this may be one of the most promising and effective means to stabilize cultures of peace within and between societies.

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