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## Including Others (and Groups) in the Self Self-Expansion and Intergroup Relations

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### INTRODUCTION

**T**he idea that the self extends beyond the confines of the individual person, to include more than personal characteristics and attributes, is now a common theme in many social psychological analyses of the self (e.g., Abrams & Hogg, 2001; Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Deaux, 1996; Taylor & Dubé, 1986; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994). Cross-cultural analyses (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989) and especially the social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorization (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) perspectives have been especially influential in focusing attention on the socially extended nature of the self. The initial formulation of

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social identity theory was not intended as a general theory of the self. However, one of its cornerstone ideas—that group memberships are meaningful and valued aspects of the self—has sparked considerable theorizing and rethinking about the nature of the self (e.g., Brewer, 1991; Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994; Simon, 1999).

At the same time, the idea that the self extends beyond the individual person is an essential assumption of another line of research and theory, one rooted in the study of interpersonal relations. Aron and Aron (1986, 1996) proposed a model of interpersonal relationships that holds that when two individuals become close, the other is “included” in the self. Although the language is somewhat different, the two perspectives share the conception of a self that contains aspects of other social entities—the ingroup in the case of social identity theory and the close other in the case of the Aron and Aron model. However, an important difference is found in the motives that the two perspectives see as driving the inclusion of other entities in the self. While a number of other motives have been proposed (we will consider some of these in more detail later), the social identity perspective has been dominated by the self-esteem or self-enhancement hypothesis that holds that we have a basic need for positive self-esteem, and that joining and identifying with groups is one way to meet this need (see Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). Aron and Aron (1986, 1996), on the other hand, theorize that the inclusion of others in the self is motivated by a need for self-expansion. The basic premise of the *self-expansion model* is that people seek to enhance their potential efficacy by expanding the self to include material and social resources, perspectives, and identities that will facilitate achievement of goals (for a recent elaboration of the motivational aspect of the model, see Aron, Norman, & Aron, 1998). Thus, self-expansion in pursuit of greater general self-efficacy is a central human motivation, and one way to achieve expansion is through the development of close relationships in which the other is included in the self. However, extending this perspective to the domain of group processes and intergroup relations makes apparent the possibility that another means of self-expansion is to include relevant *groups* in the self.

In this chapter, we briefly consider a number of ways that the self-expansion model might be adapted and integrated with the study of group processes and intergroup relations. First, we consider the utility of conceptualizing ingroup identification as the inclusion of ingroup in the self, and we discuss how the self-expansion motive might influence self-categorization and ingroup identification. Second, we describe possible applications of the inclusion of other in the self and self-expansion motives to the improvement of intergroup relations. Specifically, we examine how the inclusion of other in the self might be associated with positive intergroup contact effects, and we propose an extension of the self-expansion model to explain why, under certain circumstances, we might have a strong positive interest in, and even liking for, outgroups.

## INGROUP IDENTIFICATION: INCLUDING THE INGROUP IN THE SELF

One of social identity theory's key contentions is that the self includes not only a set of unique individual characteristics (i.e., personal identities), but also includes aspects that connect the individual to others through shared group memberships (i.e., social identities). Which of these many self-aspects will become the dominant self-representation in a given circumstance is determined by both the situational/contextual cues that focus attention on that self-aspect and the accessibility of that self-aspect for the particular individual (see Abrams & Hogg, 2001; Simon & Kampmeier, 2001; Turner, et al., 1987). Thus, a given social identity will emerge as a dominant self-representation when there are strong contextual cues making that group membership salient and when that group has particular psychological significance for the individual. The bulk of the research in the social identity tradition has focused on the contextual factors that make a given ingroup more salient and meaningful (see Hogg, 2000; Oakes, 2001). However, several researchers have considered the role of *ingroup identification*—the individual's chronic psychological connection with a specific ingroup (e.g., Branscombe & Ellemers, 1998; Deaux, 2000; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997; Tropp & Wright, 1999).

Despite increased attention to ingroup identification, the meaning and parameters of the concept remain somewhat obscure (Ellemers, Kortekaas, & Ouwerkerk, 1999; Jackson & Smith, 1999). We believe this confusion stems in part from two ambiguities in the definition and use of the term. First, some authors use ingroup identification in a very general sense to refer to the present strength of a social identity, that is, the degree to which a category membership serves as immediate dominant self-representation (e.g., Hogg, 2001; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999). In this use, identification is the combined influence of contextual and individual characteristics. Certainly, we recognize that the present importance of a social identity is to a great extent determined by the immediate social context. However, we also see benefits to distinguishing between the influences of immediate context and an individual's chronic psychological attachment to the group. Thus, we limit our use of the term "ingroup identification" to refer to that part of the strength of a social identity that arises from the individual's chronic ongoing connection to the specific ingroup (e.g., Deaux, 2000).

In addition, it is productive to distinguish between *self-categorization*, *collective self-esteem* (e.g., Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992), and *ingroup identification*; where self-categorization represents the simple recognition or awareness that one is a member of the group, collective self-esteem represents how positively or negatively one evaluates that group membership, and ingroup identification involves the degree to which the person feels an enduring sense of

interconnectedness between himself/herself and the group. Thus, while necessary, self-categorization is not sufficient for ingroup identification. Nor is a positive evaluation of the ingroup sufficient to produce ingroup identification. In fact, a positive evaluation may not be necessary for ingroup identification. Thus, we believe that at its most basic level, ingroup identification represents the *degree to which the ingroup is included in the self*.

This definition of ingroup identification is consistent with, although more specific than, Tajfel's (1981) initial formulation of the concept of social identity. However, this definition derived more directly from Aron and Aron's (1986, 1996) conception of including other in the self. Aron and Aron use the term "inclusion of *other* in the self" to refer to the interconnectedness of self and other in close relationships. When people become close, rather than being perceived as separate beings, self and other are regarded as "overlapping selves," where aspects of the close other are considered part of the self. In fact, interpersonal closeness is defined by the degree of other–self overlap.

In a variety of studies, Aron, Aron, Tudor, and Nelson (1991) have demonstrated that close others function cognitively like self, while nonclose others do not. For example, Aron et al. (1991, Experiment 3) proposed that if close others are included in the self, individuals should respond more slowly, when rating the self, to characteristics that produce an *inconsistency* between oneself and the close other, since this inconsistency would interfere with cognitive processing. Conversely, individuals should respond more quickly to characteristics that produce *consistency* between oneself and the close other, as no such interference would take place. Participants rated the extent to which a series of characteristics were descriptive of themselves and of their spouse. Then, a reaction-time procedure was used to measure the speed of participants' "me/not me" judgments for these characteristics. Indeed, participants were slower in responding to characteristics that produced an inconsistency between self and spouse compared to characteristics for which perceptions of self and spouse were consistent. Smith and Henry (1996; see also Otten, this volume; Smith, this volume; Smith, Coats, & Walling, 1999) adopted this paradigm to study relationships between representations of the self and the ingroup. Consistent with the inclusion-of-ingroup-in-the-self hypothesis, they found that responses were slower for traits that produced an inconsistency between ratings of self and ingroup than for traits that were consistent for self and ingroup. Match or mismatch between self and an outgroup had no such effects.

Recently, Tropp and Wright (2001) have extended this approach to consider more directly the role of ingroup identification. Just as research has demonstrated that the degree of interpersonal closeness moderates the self–other overlap effects (Aron & Fraley, 1999; Smith et al., 1999; Smith, this volume), Tropp and Wright (2001) predicted that ingroup identification, defined as the degree to which the ingroup is included in the self, should moderate the effect found by Smith and his colleagues (see Smith, this volume) and by Otten and

her colleagues (see Otten, this volume). In order to operationalize the conception of ingroup identification as the inclusion of the ingroup in the self, Tropp and Wright adapted Aron, Aron, and Smollan's (1992) Inclusion of Other in the Self Scale (IOS Scale). The IOS Scale is a one-item scale on which participants describe the closeness of their relationship by selecting from seven pairs of circles representing various degrees of overlap between self and other. After demonstrating that this scale performs as well or better than other measures of closeness, Aron et al. (1992) concluded that its effectiveness suggests that this metaphor of overlapped selves may actually reflect how relationships are cognitively represented. In Tropp and Wright's (2001) adaptation, referred to as the Inclusion of the Ingroup in the Self Scale (IIS), the pairs of circles represent varying degrees of overlap between the self and a specified ingroup (see Figure 20.1). A series of studies using responses from samples of women and ethnic minority groups establish the construct validity, the concurrent and discriminant validity, and the test-retest reliability of the IIS. Most importantly, though, the results suggest that the IIS may capture the essence of interconnectedness between self and ingroup underlying the construct of ingroup identification (see Tropp & Wright, 2001, for an extended discussion).

Using the IIS as a pretest and the reaction-time procedure used by Smith and Henry (1996), Tropp and Wright (2001, Study 1) tested the hypothesis that cognitive representations of the self and ingroup would be less strongly connected among those low in ingroup identification compared to those who were more strongly identified with the ingroup. Thus, inconsistencies in ratings of a trait for self and ingroup should have little influence on reactions times for "me/not me" judgments of these traits among low identifiers. However, inconsistencies between self and ingroup ratings should impede reaction times among high identifiers. The results supported this prediction. As shown in Figure 20.2, participants with high IIS scores responded significantly slower to self-descriptive characteristics that were not descriptive of the ingroup (i.e., where ratings of the self and ingroup were inconsistent) than to characteristics that were both self-descriptive and ingroup-descriptive (i.e., where ratings of the self and

Instructions: Please circle the pair of circles that you feel best represents your own level of identification

"S" refers to your self, and  
"G" refers to your group





FIGURE 20.1. The Inclusion of the Ingroup in the Self (IIS) Scale. (The label of "group" can be replaced with a specific ingroup [i.e., ethnic label, gender, student affiliation, etc.] )

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**FIGURE 20.2.** Mean reaction time by high and low identifiers for self-descriptive traits that were either descriptive or nondescriptive of the ingroup.

ingroup were consistent). In contrast, participants with low IIS scores showed virtually no difference in reaction times for self-descriptive characteristics that were or were not descriptive of the ingroup (i.e., where ratings of the self and ingroup were either consistent or inconsistent). This suggests that for people low in ingroup identification (as measured by the IIS), the ingroup is not adequately included in the self-concept to produce the self/ingroup confusion found among those high in ingroup identification. These findings illustrate the importance of studying cognitive representations not only in terms of group membership but also in terms of the degree to which individuals include that group as part of their self-concepts.

### *Motivation for Ingroup Identification*

A model of ingroup identification must consider not only the impact of ingroup identification, but also motivation. Why do people join and identify with groups? Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) proposes two basic motivations for identification: *self-enhancement* and *distinctiveness*. The self-enhancement hypothesis holds that we have a basic need for positive self-esteem, and that joining and identifying with groups is one way to meet this need (see Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). Thus, we seek to belong to groups that are positively valued compared to relevant outgroups because these memberships provide us with a positive social identity. The second motive, distinctiveness, contends that we seek groups that provide adequate contrast with comparison outgroups. Thus,

groups that are clearly distinguishable from relevant outgroups are preferred. Both these motives are thought to influence not only joining and identification with groups, but also the individual's understandings of the intergroup relations and intergroup behavior, producing ingroup bias and actions that increase intergroup contrasts.

The self-enhancement motive has received considerable attention, but reviews of the research have revealed inconsistencies. It appears that when intergroup comparisons result in the perception that the ingroup holds higher status than a comparison outgroup, self-esteem is enhanced (e.g., Lemyre & Smith, 1985). However, there appears to be little consistent evidence that self-enhancement is the only or even the primary motivation for identification with a group. Numerous authors have pointed out that people often show strong identification with groups that are recognized to hold low status positions (e.g., Mlicki & Ellemers, 1996; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998).

The distinctiveness motive has been considered in a number of ways. First, there is some evidence that an outgroup that is seen to be "too similar" to the ingroup can raise identity threats and efforts to increase the distinctive character of the ingroup (Jetten, Spears & Manstead, 1997; Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997). Self-categorization theory focuses on the role of group distinctiveness in meeting the need for self-explanation and self-evaluation. Self-categorization provides meaningful information about the social world and about our place in it. Ingroups that are well differentiated from other groups can provide explicit and unambiguous information about who belongs, and perhaps more importantly, whether we belong. Thus, if identification is motivated by a need for meaning, groups that are well differentiated from other groups are more likely to attract our identification.

Hogg and his colleagues (see Hogg, 2000, 2001; Hogg & Abrams, 1993) have extended the self-categorization idea that self-categorization and ingroup identification serve an explanatory function. Rather than distinctiveness, self-esteem, or simple explanation, Hogg and his colleagues focus on ways that categorization (and especially self-categorization) serves to reduce subjective uncertainty. From this perspective, we engage in social categorization primarily to simplify the complexities of the social world. Similarly, identification with the ingroup is motivated by the need to clarify important concerns about the state of that world. Supporting this view, Grieve and Hogg (1999) and Mullin and Hogg (1999) have demonstrated in a number of studies that self-categorization occurs and ingroup identification increases when uncertainty is high and decreases when uncertainty is low.

Brewer and her colleagues (e.g., Brewer, 1991; Brewer & Pickett, 1999, this volume) have also extended social identity theory's focus on distinctiveness in the theory of optimal distinctiveness. Here, distinctiveness is seen as one need that stands in constant opposition to a need for inclusion or belonging (see also Leary, this volume). Thus, identification is motivated both by a need for

differentiation from other social entities and by a need to be part of a larger social entity. Findings that smaller minority groups tend to attract stronger identification than larger majority groups is seen as evidence for the optimal distinctiveness model. There is also evidence that priming inclusion needs can heighten identification with larger more inclusive groups, while priming distinctiveness needs can heighten identification with relatively smaller more exclusive groups (see Brewer & Pickett, this volume, for a review).

Thus, the self-enhancement and group distinctiveness motives originally proposed by social identity theory have been supplemented and challenged by other perspectives regarding the motivation for ingroup identification. In the next section, we propose an additional motive, self-expansion, and consider briefly how the self-expansion model compares with some of these other perspectives.

### *Self-Expansion as a Motivation for Ingroup Identification*

The self-expansion model proposes that we have a strong motive to expand the self and that one way to achieve this is to include others in the self. In doing so, we take on the resources, perspectives, and identities and of the other, thus making them part of who we are. The motive that underlies the desire for self-expansion is an increase in one's sense of general self-efficacy. Extending the self-expansion perspective from the domain of interpersonal relationships to group processes, we propose that ingroup identification (including the ingroup in the self) is, at least in part, the result of self-expansion motives. That is, we seek to include groups in the self because doing so increases our confidence that we can meet the demands of our world and achieve goals. Several interesting connections can be drawn between self-expansion motives and the other major perspectives on motivation for ingroup identification.

### *Self-Expansion, Uncertainty Reduction, and Ingroup Identification*

Interestingly, the self-expansion and uncertainty reduction models share some basic tenets. First and foremost, both postulate something like a need for control as the basic underlying motivate. Hogg (2001) wrote that "uncertainty about one's attitudes, beliefs, feelings and perceptions, as well as about oneself and other people, is aversive . . . because it is ultimately associated with reduced control over one's life" (p. 478). Similarly, Aron, Aron, and Norman (2001) wrote that "people seek to expand the self in the sense that they seek to enhance their potential efficacy by increasing the physical and social resources, perspectives, and identities that facilitate achievement of any goal that might arise" (p. 227).

There is a long and extensive literature on the importance of perceived control (see Skinner, 1992). Feelings of uncontrollability have numerous nega-

tive consequences (e.g., Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Deci & Ryan, 1991; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Seligman, 1975), and the desire for control can be a powerful motivator (Stevens & Fiske, 1995). In some cases, control motives can lead one to seek knowledge that will explain the present distribution of outcomes, or even better, allow one to predict subsequent outcomes (Fiske & Depret, 1996). Thus, need for control is associated with information seeking in an effort to explain and predict events.

Hogg's (2001) subjective uncertainty reduction model is clearly consistent with this desire for control. Knowing what the relevant group boundaries are and to which group one belongs allows one to explain important aspects of the social world and even to predict subsequent events. In addition, self-categorization evokes group norms that prescribe specific responses to events and, thus, increase our sense of control over future outcomes. We might conclude that it is the feelings of uncontrollability that result from subjective uncertainty that provide the primary motivation for ingroup identification; that is, the subjective uncertainty reduction motive may essentially represent an attempt to increase one's sense of control.

Self-expansion is also directly linked to control motives. In addition to acquiring knowledge that will provide explanation and prediction, control motives also inspire efforts to acquire the resources and status that allow one to directly influence the environment to ensure that it provides the desired outcomes. Expanding one's resources by including the group in the self, increases the likelihood that one will be able to exert direct control over self-relevant events. Thus, it appears that both uncertainty reduction and self-expansion perspectives share the view that identification arises in part from a desire to increase one's sense of control.

The two perspectives also describe a similar relationship between their respective motives and self-enhancement. Hogg (2001) proposed that uncertainty reduction may underlie the self-enhancement associated with identification because high self-esteem is contingent upon self-certainty. Thus, increases in self-esteem associated with ingroup identification may not result directly from that group membership, but rather as the indirect result of the greater self-clarity and self-certainty that membership provides. Similarly, self-expansion sees self-enhancement as a by-product of self-expansion. Aron, Paris, and Aron (1995) found that after falling in love (and thus presumably including another in the self) there was an increase in perceived self-efficacy and an associated increase in self-esteem. They concluded that this occurs because people feel good about themselves to the extent that they possess the resources needed to accomplish their goals. Similarly, identification with a group (including the group in the self) should enhance self-esteem because the newly acquired resources increase self-efficacy. Thus, both models see the self-enhancement that can result from ingroup identification as a by-product of satisfying a more basic motive (uncertainty reduction or self-expansion).

However, the two perspectives have a somewhat different general focus. Uncertainty reduction paints a picture of the person locked in a constant battle against an insecure and anxiety-provoking world—as facing a ceaseless tide of uncertainty, confusion, and angst. Although Hogg (2001) recognized that we may at times experience a background of relative certainty, the focus is clearly on our quest to solve existing problems with uncertainty and insecurity. The self-expansion model, on the other hand, portrays the individual as much more secure and represents our interactions with the world as much more appetitive. Ordinarily, the individual seeks novelty and opportunity. The difference between these perspectives is not inconsistent with the distinction made by Higgins (1998) between promotional and preventative regulatory systems (see also Smith, this volume). Like the preventative system, uncertainty reduction focuses on avoiding negative outcomes and ensuring security. By contrast, like the promotional system, self-expansion focuses on continual growth.

Perhaps because of these different foci, the two perspectives produce some divergent predictions. Because uncertainty reduction focuses on the need for understanding and clarity, it predicts that we will tend to identify with groups that are *consistent* with our existing self-perceptions, as these groups validate and clarify our self-knowledge and, thus, create the greatest certainty. Thus, similar and familiar groups will be preferred. In the case of the self-expansion model, the motivation is to expand the self. Thus, groups that are to some degree *divergent* from the present self may be more attractive. That is, rather than preferring groups that easily validate our present self-conceptions, we may seek group memberships that add new self-aspects, perhaps even challenging the present self-concept.

However, this divergence in perspective is not as extreme as it initially appears. Although we have focused on the appetitive aspects of the self-expansion model, the theory also proposes the opponent process of self-integration. Self-expansion must be followed by periods of integration where newly acquired self-aspects are integrated into existing self-schema. Self-expansion that is too rapid or extensive to allow adequate integration is distressing, even aversive. Similarly, the uncertainty reduction approach could be extended to consider situations where the individual experiences relative certainty and security, and then seeks a broader array of self-categorizations to shield against future challenges and uncertainties. This idea is consistent with Linville's (1985) notion that having a diverse self (one with more identities) can be adaptive, as other aspects of the self can buffer threats to a particular self-aspect.

In sum, the self-expansion and uncertainty reduction models, despite their entirely different pedigrees (intergroup relations and social identity for uncertainty reduction, and interpersonal relations and intimacy for self-expansion), share a number of very similar notions on the nature of the self and the motivations associated with self processes.

### *Self-Expansion, Optimal Distinctiveness, and Ingroup Identification*

The basic prediction of optimal distinctiveness theory appears to be that groups that most consistently balance inclusiveness and distinctiveness needs should attract the greatest identification. The central idea of a push and pull of opposing motives found at the heart of optimal distinctiveness is also central to the self-expansion model. Restraining the desire for self-expansion is the need to integrate newly acquired self-aspects. Like the opposition of inclusiveness and differentiation, the opposition of expansion and integration determines the type of, the number of, and the pace at which groups can be included in the self. For example, highly inclusive groups and/or groups with prototypes that differ greatly from the present self-schema would be difficult to integrate and thus may not be readily or deeply included in the self.

In addition, Brewer and Pickett (this volume) argue that the need for inclusiveness results from “an even more fundamental need for security and safety” and explicitly connect this to the idea that belongingness needs arise from the vulnerability of lone individuals (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; see also Williams, Wheeler, & Harvey, 2001). This language is not inconsistent with self-expansion’s central motive of enhancing one’s general efficacy. In addition, Brewer’s suggestion that large highly inclusive groups are best able to meet belongingness needs is consistent with the view that in general larger more inclusive groups would provide the greatest opportunity for self-expansion. Thus, the two perspectives provide very similar explanations for why we seek membership in larger inclusive groups.

However, self-expansion motives seem inconsistent with the optimal distinctiveness model’s need for personal uniqueness. The active pursuit of the perspectives and identities of others (and groups) proposed by self-expansion implies that we are quite willing to sacrifice independence and uniqueness in favor of a larger more diverse self. The self-expansion model’s explanation for attraction to smaller more exclusive groups would be similar to that proposed by Hogg’s subjective uncertainty reduction model. Smaller more exclusive groups are likely to have clearer, better articulated prototypes than larger more inclusive groups. Thus, these smaller groups will make easily apparent the resources, perspectives, and identities that would be gained through group membership.

In short, optimal distinctiveness and self-expansion share some similarities in their structure and propose similar explanations for the appeal of larger more inclusive groups. However, the uniqueness motive central to optimal distinctiveness theory has no analogous process in the self-expansion model.

### *Summary*

The idea of including other in the self fits nicely into social psychology’s general understanding of ingroup identification, and the self-expansion model provides

novel and potentially useful explanations for ingroup identification processes. Although consistent with some aspects of other motivational models of ingroup identification, the self-expansion perspective yields a number of divergent hypotheses. Our general view is that self-expansion complements these other models by providing an alternative explanation for why people join groups and why some group memberships have such a significant influence on thoughts, attitudes, and actions.

## SELF-EXPANSION, INCLUDING OTHERS IN THE SELF, AND IMPROVING INTERGROUP RELATIONS

### *Intergroup Contact and Including Others in the Self*

Recently, we have investigated the utility of the self-expansion model in explaining the dynamics associated with intergroup contact. The intergroup contact hypothesis has been among the most enduring theoretical perspectives in the study of intergroup relations (Allport, 1954; Amir, 1976; Hewstone & Brown, 1986; Miller & Brewer, 1984; Pettigrew, 1986, 1998; Stephan, 1987). Essentially, it proposes that, under specific circumstances, contact between members of different groups reduces negative intergroup attitudes. Recently, the contact hypothesis has experienced something of a renaissance fueled by a number of interesting new lines of research (e.g., Brown, Vivian, & Hewstone, 1999; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2000).

We have been particularly interested in recent work by Pettigrew (1997, 1998; see also Herek & Capitanio, 1996) suggesting that interpersonal friendship may be the particular form of contact most likely to produce a generalized reduction in prejudice (that is, reductions in prejudice toward the outgroup as a whole). Using data from a large international European sample, Pettigrew (1997) demonstrated that having an outgroup friendship predicted lower levels of subtle and blatant prejudice, greater support for pro-outgroup policies, and even generalized positive attitudes toward outgroups not involved in the contact. Having a cross-group coworker or neighbor produced much smaller effects than cross-group friendships (see Hamberger & Hewstone, 1997, for a complementary analysis of this data).

Pettigrew (1997) focused on the importance of positive affect associated with interpersonal friendship, and proposed that this affect leads to generalized empathy and identification with the outgroup. However, no clear mechanism is provided to describe how this generalization occurs. Why should positive affect toward an individual produce empathy or identification with the outgroup as a whole? We propose that the notion of including the other in the self provides a basis for such a mechanism. The logic is this: when one becomes close to a member of an outgroup, aspects of the outgroup member are included in the self. When that individual's social identity (his/her group membership) is made

salient, that social identity may also be included in the self. Thus, through the close friend, the outgroup is included in the self and is then accorded some of the benefits usually accorded to the self (i.e., positive biases in attribution and resource allocation, feelings of empathy with their troubles, taking pride in their successes, generously sharing resources, etc.).

It is important to explicate what we mean by “including the outgroup in the self.” Sometimes, this can mean actually acquiring membership in that group. For example, forming a close relationship with someone may give us real entrée into some of that person’s groups (e.g., friendship groups, clubs, even his/her family should we marry). In other cases, actual membership in the outgroup is unlikely (e.g., ethnic, national, or occupational groups). Here, the connection involves psychological identification with the outgroup, such that events that effect the group now have personal meaning. In this case, the group is included in the self even though the person may be keenly aware that he/she is not actually included in the group.

Thus, “inclusion of other in the self” provides a mechanism to explain how friendship with a single outgroup member can lead to improved attitudes and actions toward the outgroup as a whole. Notice, this mechanism focuses on the importance of *interpersonal closeness* in the cross-group relationship. Including the other in the self is reserved for those with whom we share a *close* relationship. Thus, superficial or nonfriendly cross-group interactions should not serve to produce the necessary link between self and the other’s group.

With inclusion of other in the self as the theoretical basis, we have carried out a number of studies that have attempted to clarify the role of cross-group friendship—and more specifically interpersonal closeness—in cross-group contact effects. Since our basic prediction is that it is the sense of intimacy and resulting inclusion of the other in the self that is responsible for the more positive intergroup attitudes, it was first necessary to demonstrate the direct role of intimacy per se in intergroup contact effects. The correlation between friendship and positive intergroup attitude found in the existing research literature can not explicitly rule out the possibility that intimacy and positive intergroup attitudes both result from greater quantity of contact or greater number of outgroup contacts (e.g., the development of a social network in the outgroup). McLaughlin-Volpe, Aron, Wright, and Reis (2000) have completed two questionnaire studies (one involving interethnic attitudes and another using attitudes toward rival universities), and a third study using a diary procedure (a version of the Rochester Interaction Record method, Reis & Wheeler, 1991; see also Williams et al., 2001). In all three studies, having outgroup friends was associated with less prejudice. More importantly, the amount of outgroup contact and the number of outgroup friends had little influence on prejudice. Rather, it was the extent to which one included a particular member of the outgroup in the self that predicted differences in prejudice toward that specific outgroup, such that the more inclusion of other in the self, the less prejudice. Also, in the

diary study, structural equation modeling analyses suggested unique causal paths in both directions—including others in the self led to reduced prejudice, and reduced prejudice led to including others in the self. However, the path from inclusion to reduced prejudice was stronger and more consistent. Finally, in each study there was a significant interaction in predicting prejudice between number of interactions and inclusion of other in the self. When inclusion of other in the self was high, the more interactions, the less prejudice. However, when inclusion of other in the self was low, more interactions had either no impact on prejudice or actually lead to *greater* prejudice. In sum, the findings from all three studies are consistent with the inclusion of other in the self perspective and provide evidence of the importance of interpersonal closeness in intergroup contact effects.

While these findings are very encouraging, they all involve cross-sectional data and, like earlier survey data (Pettigrew, 1997), cannot unambiguously answer the question of causal direction. The alternative causal hypothesis, that those low in prejudice seek outgroup friends while those high in prejudice avoid outgroup members, is also very reasonable. To address this issue, Wright and Van der Zande (1999) used a laboratory procedure to demonstrate experimentally the causal direction from friendship to more positive intergroup attitudes. European American (White) women were randomly paired with either a cross-group (Asian-American or Latina) or a same-group (White) partner. Over an 8-week period, the partners met 4 times to engage in a series of friendship-building activities. Feelings of closeness were measured following each of the four activities. After the final meeting, under the guise of an unrelated second study, participants completed several measures of intergroup attitudes.

The data from the White participants showed that women in both same-group (White/White) partnerships and cross-group (White/Latina, White/Asian) partnerships developed strong feelings of closeness with their partners (i.e., we were able to produce relatively strong feelings of interpersonal closeness between same-group and cross-group randomly assigned pairs in the laboratory). More importantly, a number of measures showed that White women who became close with a Latina or Asian-American woman held significantly more positive intergroup attitudes than did White women who made friends with another White women. For example, those who had made outgroup friends indicated lower endorsement of several “anti-minority” policies—policies that had been the subject of recent highly publicized electoral propositions in California (where this study was conducted). Also, compared to those making an ingroup friend, those who made an outgroup friend reported lower feelings of anxiety at the prospect of cross-ethnic interactions. The least obvious, and perhaps most behavioral, measure was Haddock, Zanna, and Esses’s (1993) “budget-cutting task.” Participants were asked to assist the university in deciding how to distribute anticipated budget cuts to 15 student organizations. The task asked participants to redistribute resources among the organizations such that

they cut a total of \$5,000 from the total budget. The list of organizations included the “Latino/Chicano Student Association” and the “Asian & Pacific Islander Student Alliance.” Figure 20.3 shows that participants who had made an Asian-American or Latina friend cut significantly less money from the organization representing that friend’s ethnic group. Thus, the results clearly support the claim that making an outgroup friend leads to improvements in White participants’ attitudes toward the outgroup as a whole.

Finally, feelings of closeness to the cross-group partner appear to be directly involved in the improvement in intergroup attitudes. For participants in the cross-group condition, there was a significant positive correlation between reported closeness to partner and intergroup attitudes. This is consistent with the claim that interpersonal closeness mediates the effect of the friendship-making manipulation on generalized intergroup attitudes.

*Self-Expansion and Outgroup Orientation*

The social psychology literature is replete with explanations for outgroup intolerance and even hatred. Mechanisms range from evolutionary predisposition, to personality characteristics, to basic cognitive and motivational processes, to abstract principles and political orientations. Compared to this multilevel conglomeration of reasons to avoid and even persecute outgroups, we find almost no explanations for why people might tolerate, let alone seek out, positive interactions with outgroups. It seems that abstract, even esoteric beliefs about justice and equality are the meager sandbags standing against a torrent of more




FIGURE 20.3. White participants’ percentage budget cut to each of the Asian and Latino student organizations.

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basic processes that lead inevitably toward negative intergroup relations. However, as Pettigrew (1997) asked “beyond media headlines of intergroup turmoil, most groups throughout the world achieve some degree of stability and mutual acceptance in their interactions. Why?” (p. 182). One explanation for our apparent inability to answer Pettigrew’s query might be that in our efforts to explain the most problematic aspects of intergroup relations (prejudice and hatred), we have failed to as deeply consider the more mundane (tolerance and stability).

We propose that self-expansion may provide one example of a basic human motivational process that would predict an appetitive interest in outgroups and, thus, stands as an opponent to the many motivations to avoid and persecute outgroups. The logic follows directly from the basic premise of the self-expansion model—that people seek to expand the self and thus seek relationships with others that increase their constellation of resources, perspectives, and identities. Others who share most of our present perspectives and identities provide only limited potential for self-expansion, while those with divergent perspectives and identities provide the greatest opportunity for self-expansion. Thus, at least initially, we should be drawn to others who are highly divergent from ourselves. Groups whose identities, perspectives, and resources are detached from one’s own should be particularly appealing. This perspective provides a potential explanation for the billions of dollars spent annually by people travelling to “exotic” places. Admittedly, many tourists prefer to simply observe from the comfort of a bus or a hotel that mirror their own culture. However, many seek to immerse themselves to some degree in the host culture and to “get to know” the local residents. This inclination toward those who are different is consistent with self-expansion motives.

This basic assumption provides the foundation for a variety of more complex hypotheses. Space considerations preclude a full analysis of all the implications of this model for intergroup relations. Nonetheless, we will briefly review a few examples. First, the self-expansion model recognizes that self-expansion needs are restrained by the need for self-integration, making unbridled self-expansion stressful. Thus, we would predict that outgroups will be most appealing when we have not just experienced significant self-expansion in other domains. For example, someone who has recently taken a new job, fallen in love, or moved to a new city might seek interactions with ingroup members with whom forming a relationship would demand only limited additional self-expansion. On the other hand, individuals who are securely entrenched in their present social world might be drawn to outgroup members. Thus, interest in outgroups may be moderated by recent and ongoing self-expansion in other domains.

Secondly, self-expansion in one domain may result in the loss of self-aspects in another. For example, if an academic accepts an offer from another university, he/she has an opportunity for considerable self-expansion. The new group offers a variety of resources, perspectives, and identities not presently available. However, there is also considerable potential for reduction in the self.

She/he must sacrifice the identities and resources provided by the present institution, by the present friendship groups, and so forth. Thus, we would predict a kind of cost-benefit analysis whereby the potential for self-expansion offered by including a new group in the self is weighed against the potential for self-loss. Similarly, forging a connection with an outgroup may be unappealing if the relationship between that group and my present ingroup is extremely negative. Including such an outgroup in the self risks rejection by my present ingroup and the loss of that self-aspect. Thus, the degree to which including the outgroup in the self will result in a net expansion of the self is in part determined by the state of relations between that outgroup and present ingroups.

There are numerous other potential applications of this perspective. However, even from these few examples it is clear that self-expansion paints the outgroup in a very different light than most other models of intergroup relations. Certainly, the appeal of the outgroup is restricted by other considerations, such as the need for self-integration and the possible loss of other important self-aspects. Nonetheless, the self-expansion model represents contact with outgroups as an attractive social experience. Outgroups, *because of their divergence from the present self*, provide an interesting and appealing opportunity for self-expansion.

## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, we have briefly considered a number of ways that the self-expansion model might be adapted and integrated with ideas from the study of group processes and intergroup relations. We propose that the concept of including others in the self can be extended to provide a useful model of how ingroups become part of the self-concept. In addition, self-expansion motives provide a novel motivational account of ingroup identification, one that may prove a valuable complement to other existing perspectives. We have also considered how self-expansion and including other in the self provide potential mechanisms to explain how generalized positive intergroup attitudes can result from interpersonal cross-group contact. Finally, with its focus on the appeal of entities that have the potential to expand the self, self-expansion provides a refreshing contrast to most discussions of motivation in intergroup relations. The self-expansion model portrays outgroups as possible targets of interest rather than targets of indifference and intolerance.

We share the enthusiasm of others in this collection (Brewer & Pickett; Mackie & Smith; Smith; all this volume) for the possibility of illuminating similarities and consistencies in the processes that guide interpersonal and intergroup phenomena. However, we have also attempted to represent the unique ways in which group memberships and intergroup relations influence the specifics of how these common underlying processes manifest themselves.

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